

# Ship bridge collisions


AXEL HÖRTEBORN, RISE SWEDEN  
2024-09-04

# Agenda

- Where I come from
- AIS data
- Ship failures
- The STAPS model
- Some examples
  - Great belt
  - Halsafjorden
  - Baltimore and USA bridges

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# Maritime Department

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# Member of PIANC Working group 215



PIANC  
The World Association for  
Waterborne Transport Infrastructure.

- Started 2018
- Almost complete
- Hopefully going to MarCom in October

Report No. **xxx-**



**ACCIDENTAL IMPACTS FROM SHIPS ON  
FIXED STRUCTURES**

Design Considerations, Working Group 215



# AIS Data


- Mandatory on all ships > 300 GT
- Transponder sends a dynamic signal every 3 – 10 second and static signal every 5 minutes




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2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,13u=w5g000QDK:0RQeBdk@;@00SD,0*02
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,5,A,13uB9;PP000t:bFOck@ciOwB20SG,0*14
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,A,15VpTB001E0kkNDPwFFCTI=:06pd,0*1B
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,13u>f000000m;v0Q3cPo8iw@0pgo,0*21
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,A,13u?mo?v00Q;hndR6fd<pJkp0t05,0*1C
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,B3uCQA0000Dd9b`O<t03wkuP06,0*72
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,13KG06001J18>?hot`69H7Q:00R`,0*4F
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,33@NF:00i2QHDefPjvm1M15>00rh,0*5B
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,A,13@oU8h0000nB@rPw3tFqHA@0<20,0*0B
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM,1,1,B,33u=I?301@Q>3vfPN=47h6?>00tP,0*75
2014-12-06T23:05:40Z !ABVDM.1.1..B.13uDR4aP0013D0<P8P?LGow@2@GO.0*5D
    
```


# Ship failure (1/3)




1. Drifting failure



2. Sharp turning




3. Missing turning point



3. Missing turning point


# Ship failure (2/3)



# Ship failure (3/3)




# Pedersen's categories vs. failures



# STAPS – Ship Traffic Allision Probability using monte carlo Simulations

## 1. Gather input


- AIS Data
  - Failure rates
  - Traffic volume
  - Route layout
- Ship models
- Spatial layout
- Environmental conditions




## 2. MonteCarlo simulate input parameters

## 3. Run manoeuvre simulations in fast time

## 4. Compile result and analyse mitigation options





# Starting points in a simulation




- Ship types
- Routes
- Failure types

# Gathering of start values



# Great belt bridge (1/3)



## A method for risk analysis of ship collisions with stationary infrastructure using AIS data and a ship manoeuvring simulator

Axel Hörteborn<sup>a,b,\*</sup>, Jonas W. Ringsberg<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> SSPA Sweden AB, SE-400 22, Gothenburg, Sweden

<sup>b</sup> Chalmers University of Technology, Department of Mechanics and Maritime Science, Division of Marine Technology, SE-412 96, Gothenburg, Sweden

### ARTICLE INFO

**Keywords:**  
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 Allision energy  
 Event identification  
 Ship-bridge allision  
 Ship grounding  
 Ship manoeuvring simulator

### ABSTRACT

The study presents a methodology that uses AIS data and a ship manoeuvring simulator to simulate and analyse marine traffic schemes with regard to risks for accidents. An event identification method is presented, which is needed for the accident scenario part of the methodology. This is based on AIS data, where the Great Belt VTS area was used to verify the methodology. Three events that could result in ship-bridge allisions were modelled and simulated in the simulator: drifting ship, sharp turning ship and miss of turning point. The Monte Carlo method was used to perform large number of simulator runs, including a parameter sensitivity analysis. The probability of a ship allision against the Great Belt Bridge was calculated to be 0.007. Analysis of the ship-bridge allision cases was shown to be dominated by the event drifting ship. This event has a relatively low kinetic energy at the impact, and the expected allision energy for a 1,000-year allision corresponds to a 178 m tanker with 57,870 DWT and ship speed 14.6 knots. Finally, this study presents a mitigation analysis, which shows how the probability of allisions can be reduced by reducing the ship speed or altering the traffic separation scheme.

### 1. Introduction

The advancement in bridge building engineering during the 20th century created an opportunity to build large bridges that span over wide waterways with intensive ship traffic. Risk analysis was used as the method to ensure that the bridge design and waterway traffic fulfilled expected safety standards. Despite this, 34 major bridge collapses occurred in the period from 1960 to 2007 that were caused by ship-bridge allisions (def.: ship collision with a bridge), which resulted in the loss of more than 340 lives (AASHTO, 2009). In addition to environmental and service loads that form the basis of the strength design of a bridge spanning over a waterway, the accidental probability of various hazardous events and accidental loads must also be considered.

In Europe, the norms and standards for all building codes are described in the Eurocode. In Eurocode 1, general equations are proposed for the calculation of accidental loads to be used in the design of bridges (CEN, 2006). For ship-bridge allisions, these equations are based on Eq. (1) with reference to the research presented by Fujii (1983) and Macduff (1974):

$$N_{AI} = N \times P_c \quad (1)$$

where  $N_{AI}$  is the number of allisions,  $N$  is the number of ships and  $P_c$  is the causation factor. There is limited guidance in Eurocode 1 on how the causation factor should be determined. Pedersen (1995, 2000) proposed that it can be estimated using the number of accidents (or allisions for ship-bridge contacts) divided by the number of ship passages. Since this approach relies on the number of reported accidents and traffic statistics in the area of interest, the accuracy of the value of the calculated causation factor depends on these data. Hasel et al. (2011) and Pearsos et al. (2010) found that only approximately 50 percent of all accidents are reported in accident statistics databases, hence, the causation factor is underestimated (and, thereby, the probability of accidents).

This study presents a new methodology that handles the shortcomings in the determination of the causation factor in the risk analysis. It uses the approach proposed by Hollnagel et al. (2006) to identify scenarios that lead to accidents, together with AIS data, to calculate the probability of ship collisions with fixed infrastructure; this approach is applied in the study as ship-bridge allision. Hollnagel et al. (2006) proposed that there are different "layers" leading to an accident that should be assessed: root cause, event and the accident itself. For example, an officer on watch falls asleep [root cause], the ship continues past a turning point [event] and ultimately grounds [accident]. The

\* Corresponding author. SSPA Sweden AB, SE-400 22, Gothenburg, Sweden.  
 Email address: Axel.Horteborn@sspa.se (A. Hörteborn).

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
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


# Great belt bridge (3/3)




- From one accident every 140 year
- To one accident every 210 year
- Mostly reduced the allisions of ships with high speed


# Examples from Halsafjorden




- Turning at the wrong location
- Setting the wrong course at the turning point



# Energy map – Halsafjorden



# Baltimore Dali and example



# Washington Post and New York Times





QUESTIONS?

AXEL HÖRTEBORN  
[axel.horteborn@ri.se](mailto:axel.horteborn@ri.se)